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I. INTRODUCTION
In a well-regulated market with minimal risk of abuse, the liquidity
and information efficiency benefits of short selling far outweigh its
potential harm. Contrary to the recent hostility short sellers face from
market regulators and the popular press,' short sellers in aggregate are
neither market villains nor agents of destruction. While a small minority of
short sellers have exploited lax regulation and inattentive enforcement of
anti-abuse rules to manipulate stock prices and earn substantial fees, these
rare episodes suggest that the world's major capital markets need better
enforcement of existing rules and not new rules per se. The failure of
market regulators to prevent abuse and manipulation of stock prices by
SJ.D. Candidate, 2010, Northwestern University School of Law. I would like to thank
Professor Olufunmilayo Arewa for her insightful comments and research support and Joanna
Rubin for her valuable editorial assistance.
Owen Lamont describes this hostility:
Regulations and procedures administered by the SEC, the Federal Reserve, the
various stock exchanges, underwriters, and individual brokerage firms can
mechanically impede short selling. Legal and institutional constraints inhibit or
prevent investors from selling short.. .. We have many institutions set up to
encourage individuals to buy stocks, but few institutions set up to encourage them
to short....
In addition to regulations, short sellers face hostility from society at large. Policy
makers and the general public seem to have an instinctive reaction that short
selling is morally wrong . . . usually in times of crisis or following major price
declines . . . short sellers are blamed.
Owen Lamont, Short Sale Constraints and Overpricing, in SHORT SELLING: STRATEGIES,
RIsKs AND REwARDs 179, 182-83 (Frank J. Fabozzi ed., 2004).
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short sellers and curb naked short selling reflects a failure of enforcement,
not bad underlying policy.
In 2008, market regulators, including the United States Securities and
Exchange Commission ("SEC") and the United Kingdom Financial
Services Authority ("FSA"), attempted to restore investor confidence in
public capital markets and to protect financial institutions from rapid
devaluation of their stock by temporarily banning short positions in certain
securities. Less than one year later, the SEC and FSA bans have lapsed and
there is no clear evidence that these emergency restrictions protected the
markets or the underlying financial institutions from harm and volatility.
Indeed, one published study argues that the SEC's initial ban on naked short
selling in certain financial stocks caused market quality and market
efficiency to deteriorate.2 Today, market regulators seek to rebuild a short
selling policy that allows covered short selling while reducing the risk of
market abuse and bear raids (instances in which short sellers force down
stock prices by shorting stocks in very high volumes). The reinforced
framework must include rules and regulations that increase market
efficiency, enhance visibility of short selling to regulators and to investors,
improve regulators' responsiveness to market failures and periods of
extreme volatility, and enforce anti-abuse laws consistently and judiciously.
While short selling increases efficiency and liquidity in capital markets,
short selling is a flawed market efficiency mechanism that will not work
without the supportive architecture of an effective regulatory system and the
vigilant enforcement of anti-abuse laws by market regulators.
In the past several years, the various approaches to short selling
regulation adopted by regulators of the world's largest capital market have
attracted tremendous attention. The debate escalated after the SEC changed
U.S. securities law to allow so-called "naked" short sales in July 2007.
After a short quiet period, the debate resurfaced when the FSA, SEC, and
other regulators temporarily banned short selling of certain securities in
2008. Although no empirical evidence proves that the 2007 SEC decision
to allow naked short selling caused the market volatility of 2008, the global
financial crisis provoked public demand for increased regulation and
government control over securities transactions. As investors lost faith in
the regulations of the last century, governments responded with new and, in
some cases, austere measures to reduce opportunistic and manipulative
investor behavior and restore public confidence.
2 Arturo Bris, Short Selling Activity in Financial Stocks and the SEC July 15th
Emergency Order (Aug. 12, 2008) (unpublished manuscript, on file with the Institute of
Management Development, the European Corporate Governance Institute and the Yale
International Center for Finance), available at http://www.imd.ch/news/upload/Report.pdf.
3 Press Release, SEC, SEC Votes on Regulation SHO Amendments and Proposals; Also
Votes to Eliminate "Tick" Test (June 13, 2007), available at
http://www.sec.gov/news/press/2007/2007-114.htm.
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Today's headlines, however urgent, are not unfamiliar to securities
market historians. The debate about the merits of short selling has been
ongoing in securities and commodities exchanges for close to 300 years.4
Historically, the debate has captured public attention in the midst of
financial crises and bear markets, and ebbed as the rush of a bull market
draws attention to other concerns-and restores faith in market efficiency.
Today, hedge funds are the largest investors short selling securities.
Some critics believe that hedge funds, acting deliberately and with the
intent to manipulate securities prices, affect the value of securities by
shorting them in high volumes.5 While hedge funds (and the broker-dealers
they use to execute their transactions) are certainly a primary target of the
current regulations regarding short sales, the SEC and FSA have adopted
policies that regulate investment behavior rather than policies that target
certain types of investors. This approach suggests that exchange regulators
are willing to accommodate the changing character of major investors in
their regulatory regimes. However, future regulatory decisions must
prioritize the nature of accommodation and focus on the impact on
securities markets of consolidated investment and large-scale arbitrage
investment by hedge funds.
This comment outlines past attempts to regulate short selling, explains
the emergency regulations enacted in 2008 in response to the financial
crisis, and offers a series of recommendations for policymakers as they
contemplate a new era of short sale regulation designed to match the pace
of modern capital markets and the character of modern investors. Section II
provides a definition of terms to orient readers to the subject of the paper
and explains the perceived risk in unregulated short selling. Section III
describes historical examples of regulation and the resurgence of short
selling. Section IV reviews regulation of short selling in the United
Kingdom, and Section V reviews regulation of short selling in the United
States. Section VI explains the contemporary debate, makes policy
recommendations for future reform, and criticizes the new reactive
regulations' departure from the dominant theory that short selling is good
for capital markets. The comment concludes by promoting reform to
encourage liquidity and restore confidence in capital markets, and by
advocating a steadier course to follow in the next market decline.
II. DEFINITION OF TERMS
Rule 200(a) of SEC Regulation SHO (f/k/a Rule 3b-3 of the Securities
4 See infra Part III.
5 See generally Phillip Coorey, Foreign Raiders Threaten Banks, SYDNEY MORNING
HERALD, Mar. 3, 2009, at 1, available at http://www.smh.com.au/business/foreign-raiders-
threaten-banks-20090302-8mdo.html; Bryan Burroughs, Bringing Down Bear Stearns,
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Exchange Act) defines a short sale as "any sale of a security which the
seller does not own or any sale which is consummated by the delivery of a
security borrowed by, or for the account of, the seller."6 In a covered short
sale, the short seller, believing that the price of a stock will fall, borrows
that stock from its true owner and sells it. If the price does fall, the short
seller will buy back the stock in the open market (thereby "covering" his
position) and return the stock to its owner. Meanwhile, the short seller will
earn the difference between the original price of the stock at the time he
borrowed it and the price of the stock when he returned it to the owner.
So-called "naked" short sales are short positions for which no
underlying security has been borrowed. The SEC explains:
In a 'naked' short sale, the seller does not borrow or arrange to
borrow the securities in time to make delivery to the buyer within the
standard three-day settlement period. As a result, the seller fails to
deliver securities to the buyer when delivery is due; this is known as
a 'failure to deliver' or 'fail.' 7
The number of fails reported per quarter is an indication of the
persistence of naked short selling, often in spite of regulations in place to
bar the practice. For example, the SEC noted that Regulation SHO, adopted
to prevent investors from using naked short sales, curbed the number of
fails but did not reduce the number to zero. In response, the SEC proposed
amendments to Regulation SHO to eliminate loopholes in the closeout
rules. Even these amendments, however, did not eliminate naked short
selling.8 Likewise, the FSA has noted that while settlement discipline rules
require exchanges and clearing houses to "secure the timely discharge of
the rights and liabilities of the parties to transactions," settlement
performance is not perfect, especially for less liquid stocks.9
Regardless of the initial market price of the underlying stock, short
selling can cause temporary reductions in the value of shorted stock. When
investors take short positions, they create an excess market supply of the
shorted stock by selling borrowed shares. This sell-off causes the price of
the stock to decline-even if the actual market demand for the stock does
not change.10 In a covered short sale, the excess market supply of the
' 17 C.F.R. § 242.200(a) (2007).
SEC, Naked Short Sales, http://www.sec.gov/answers/nakedshortsale.htm (last visited
Dec. 28, 2009).
Barry P. Barbash, Recent Regulatory Developments Affecting Private Funds (Dec. 1,
2006) (unpublished manuscript, on file with the American Law Institute).
9 FiN. SERVS. AUTH. [FSA], DIsCUsSION PAPER 17: SHORT SELLING 18-19 (2002),
available at http://www.fsa.gov.uk/pubs/discussion/dpl7.pdf [hereinafter DP17] (citing a
case in which "there was short selling in the shares of a company to such an extent that the
short sales outstripped the shares in issuance. The result was that many purchasers did not
get delivery of their shares and were unable to vote at an [Extraordinary General Meeting]").
10 Christopher L. Culp & J.B. Heaton, The Economics of Naked Short Selling, REG.,
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shorted stock will be recouped when the short seller covers his position and
repurchases the available "extra" stock. At this point, if the underlying
market demand curve has not shifted, the stock price will return to its
original market value." If the market demand curve has shifted down, short
sellers will profit because the value of the shares will be below their initial
price even when the volume of available shares normalizes. In this way,
short selling can be extremely lucrative for short sellers who successfully
identify falling stocks. Reciprocally, short sellers who misgauge stock
performance and have to re-purchase securities at market prices above the
original sales price will lose money. Shorting securities is an effective way
to hedge positions (by taking both a long and a short position in a certain
security) and is a common arbitrage tactic.
In an economic analysis of short selling, Christopher Culp and J.B.
Heaton explained that a "short position is profitable only because the
demand curve [for the underlying stock] shifts down for reasons unrelated
to [the investor's] short selling, not because short selling forces it
down .... Speculative short selling, by itself, does not cause the
downward shift." 12  Therefore, short sellers who have to cover their
positions will not short a stock unless they believe the demand curve or
market value of the stock will decline. Culp and Heaton also explain how
short selling can increase stock market pricing efficiency:
The potential social benefit of short selling is that it forces prices
today closer to the amount that reflects the intersection of supply and
demand later, if we assume that the current demand is excessively
optimistic and will shift to a more rational (i.e., lower) level. Indeed,
short sellers will have an incentive to pursue their strategy until there
is no more profit available from the strategy. This will force profits
today to move toward what they should be in the future . . . .13
Proponents of short selling often point to this efficiency argument and
the increased liquidity provided by short sales to support their position.
Critics of short selling point to the temporary price reductions and
heightened market volatility induced by short sellers to advocate prohibiting
the practice.
While temporary price reductions will rebound quickly in covered
short sales, this correction will not occur promptly in a naked short sale. 14
Securities market regulators believe that market manipulators use naked
short selling to force prices below values that would be possible in covered
short selling by creating relatively long-term excess supplies of a stock
Spring 2008, at 46, 48.
1 Id
12 Id. at 47-48.
' Id. at 48.
14 Id. at 47-48.
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disproportionate to the number of shareholders willing to lend shares.' 5
Moreover, when naked short sellers must cover their positions, they create
excess demand for stocks. Thus, naked short selling creates more volatility
than covered short selling because naked short sellers can push stock prices
down and pay inflated prices to cover their positions.'6 For these reasons,
the SEC has sought to control naked short selling, while taking a relatively
lenient position towards covered short selling. Other regulators, including
the FSA, have elected to allow naked and covered short selling, although
they may take a stricter position in the future.
III. HISTORICAL OVERVIEW OF THE SHORT SELLING DEBATE:
REGULATION AND RESURGENCE
In the past several hundred years, proponents and opponents of
speculation and arbitrage in securities markets have clashed on numerous
occasions, often in the context of severe market volatility or decline. Early,
and somewhat anecdotal, examples of the debate over the merits of short
selling attracted public attention in the eighteenth century.
A well-known early example of attempted regulation of short selling
occurred in England in the 1730s. In 1710, the British Parliament
incorporated the South Sea Company, a trading company that traded in
South America. 17 Parliament first sought to use the capital raised by the
South Sea Company to finance the British Navy's war debt.'8  In 1720,
Parliament granted the South Sea Company the exclusive right to trade in
the South Seas-a task that required the company "to do for territories in
what were vaguely known as the South Seas what the East India Company
15 Christopher Cox, What the SEC Really Did on Short Selling, WALL ST. J., July 24,
2008, at Al5.
16 The sudden and dramatic increase in the price of Volkswagen shares in October 2008
is a real-world example of this effect (called a "short scramble" or "short squeeze").
Believing that Volkwagen shares were overpriced in the market and would soon fall, hedge
funds sold Volkswagen shares short in high volumes. In mid-October, Porsche disclosed
that it had amassed a 74.1% ownership stake in Volkswagen. Because the German
government owned roughly twenty percent of Volkswagen, short sellers realized that
Volkswagen's free float was less than six percent of its outstanding shares and that they had
been borrowing shares from Porsche to take their short positions. When markets opened
after Porsche disclosed its holdings in Volkswagen, Volkwagen's share price increased
eighty-five percent (to 391 Euros) as short sellers scrambled to cover their positions.
Porsche made billions of Euros from the rampant speculation in the overpricing of
Volkswagen stock. Paul Murphy, The Disreputable Market in Volkswagen, FIN. TIMES
ALPHAVILLE, Oct. 27, 2008, http://ftalphaville.ft.com/blog/2008/10/27/17465/the-
disreputable-market-in-volkswagen/; Paul Murphy, Porsche LLC? - the VW Fruit Machine
Explained, FIN. TIMES ALPHAVILLE, Oct. 17, 2008,
http://ftalphaville.ft.com/blog/2008/10/17/17150/porsche-lic-the-vw-fruit-machine-
explained/; Culp & Heaton, supra note 10, at 51.
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was doing for India." 9 Speculation in the company's stock and wild
rumors about the company's "vast potential wealth" drove the price well-
above a sustainable value:
[I]n the first list published, six years previously [in 1724], the price
was given as 1 to 1 /2. By the middle of May 1720, the price had
risen by leaps and bounds to 500, on 21st May it was 600, on 23rd
May 650, on 25th May 710 .... On 2nd August the price was 1000,
on the 7th 1100, on the 9th 1200. Then the bubble burst.20
By the end of August 1720, the South Sea Company's stock price
declined precipitously to 700 pounds per share. The price fell to eighty-six
by October.2 1 A few speculators and short sellers who had anticipated the
declines profited in the bubble, 22 while many other investors lost fortunes. 23
In 1720, the House of Commons passed a unanimous resolution that
maintained that "nothing could tend more to the establishment of public
credit than to prevent the infamous practice of stockjobbing." 2 4 In 1733, in
the wake of what is now known as the South Sea Bubble, the House of
Commons ratified a law banning naked short selling.25 The law, which was
in place for 150 years, was largely ignored by investors and was not
rigorously enforced.26
Similarly, in 1792, the New York state legislature ratified a ban on
short selling.27 Five weeks later, a group of stockbrokers in New York City
created the New York Stock Exchange ("NYSE") in the Buttonwood
Agreement to circumvent the law.28 NYSE rules allowed short selling in
direct contravention of the statute.29
Public debate again arose in Chicago among investors in the Chicago
Board of Trade and Mercantile Exchange in the 1920s. 30 Responding to the
19 Id. at 36-37.
20 Id. at 37-38.
21 Id. at 38.
22 Id. at 44.
23 DUGUID, supra note 17, at 38, 42-43 ("Ruin and desolation were sown amongst
thousands of families throughout the land.").
24 Id. at 42.
25 Dan Slater, The Latest Wachtell Memo on Short Selling: Did it Move the SEC?, WALL






30 See James C. McMath, Futures and Options: The Chicago Board of Trade, Short
Selling and Hedging, 98 CENT. L.J. 367 (1925) [hereinafter McMath, Futures and Options];
James C. McMath, Speculation in Grain for Future Delivery: What is Legal and What is
Illegal, 98 CENT. L.J. 365 (1925).
207
Northwestern Journal of
International Law & Business 30:201 (2010)
imposition by Congress of a tax on options contracts, prominent Chicago
lawyer James McMath wrote:
There is a widespread notion that selling short is wrong. It is neither
wrong nor illegal and has not been held illegal. Every short seller
must eventually become a buyer, just as every buyer long must
eventually become a seller, either before the month for delivery
arrives, or if he takes the grain he must sell it unless he has some use
for it.
... If the market was a one-sided affair, it would be very injurious
to both the producer and the consumer.
McMath argued that speculation could benefit the farmers and
consumers, whose produce and raw materials were traded in the Chicago
exchange, and should not be prohibited.32
Less than a decade later, in 1932, Richard Whitney, President of the
NYSE, gave a series of eloquent speeches in defense of short selling to the
House of Representatives and the Chambers of Commerce of Connecticut
and New York. Opposing his advocacy was William Perkins, a New
York attorney who fierce' criticized short selling and called on Congress
to regulate the practice. Whitney and Perkins publically debated the
benefits and harms of short selling as Congress was considering legislation
that would control short selling and give the Federal Trade Commission
broad power to regulate it.35 Their debates resonated with the American
public, which was still suffering in the aftermath of the stock market crash
of 1929 and the bear market of the 1930s, and influenced the drafting of the
Securities Exchange Act of 1934.
Whitney emphasized the market stabilizing effects of short selling. He
explained that "[s]hort selling is also regularly employed as a 'hedge,' not
at all for the purpose of making sPeculative profits, but for insuring against
losses due to price fluctuations." Further, he argued that "[t]he decline in
security prices has not been due to short selling, but has been due to our
unsatisfactory business conditions and to the liquidation of securities owned
outright or held on margin."3 Whitney went on to explain that economic
recessions force institutional investors, entities that would otherwise hold
securities for long periods of time, and individual investors to sell securities
31 McMath, Futures and Options, supra note 30, at 368.
32 Id at 367-68.
33 See generally SHORT SELLING, FOR AND AGAINST (Richard Whitney & William R.
Perkins eds., 1932).
34 See generally id.
3 See id. at 99-100, 167-76.
36 Richard Whitney, Short Selling, in SHORT SELLING, FOR AND AGAINST 1, 6 (1932).
3 Id. at 7.
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(a relatively liquid asset) to raise cash. According to Whitney, this
widespread liquidation, an outgrowth of the Depression, and not bear-
raiding as critics contended, was a main driver of the NYSE's decline.3 9
Whitney also argued that short sellers help create a market for other
investors' declining securities.40 Whitney's arguments parallel closely the
arguments of contemporary defenders of short selling.41
Perkins, who decried short selling as a tool of market manipulators and
as a cause of market volatility, responded to Whitney's arguments with a
series of proposals for legislative reform. First, he suggested an
"exhaustive inquiry into short selling" that would analyze the effects of
short selling on the market.42  Perkins next recommended that the stock
exchanges be brought under the authority of the Federal Trade Commission
and that brokers be brought under banking laws.43 Perkins' most draconian
proposal was that Congress impose a separate income tax on profits earned
in connection with short sales, with no offsetting losses allowed." Finally,
he recommended that banks and trust companies be prohibited from dealing
in securities.4 5
The contemporary debate echoes sentiments expressed in each of these
controversies-the public despair and outlash against traders and
speculators of the South Sea Bubble, McMath's reasoned critique of
seemingly punitive regulation, Whitney's financial economics perspective,
and Perkins' call for government intervention. While several policy
makers, publicly-traded corporations, and many nervous individual
investors fear the harms caused by manipulative short selling tactics
employed by large investors, many financial experts and industry leaders
have defended short selling as a critical means of stabilizing market prices
3 1Id at 9-10.
39 Id. at 19-20.
401 Id. at 20.
41 For example, Whitney wrote:
Stock market prices . . . are not prosperity itself, but simply an index to it. The
stock market reflects business conditions. It is not their cause. It is wrong to say
that a ban on short selling could halt our business depression. When economic
equilibrium in the world's affairs is again reestablished . .. liquidation of securities
will stop, buyers will regain confidence, and prices will rise. The prohibition of
short selling would delay and cannot hasten this process. Neither our
governmental authorities by means of legislation, nor the New York Stock
Exchange by means of its regulations, can by any magic stroke perform economic
miracles.
Id. at 22.
42 William R. Perkins, A Reply, in SHORT SELLING, FOR AND AGAINST 24, 37-38 (1932).
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and maintaining market efficiency. Indeed, the consensus among many
financial experts (including former SEC Chairman Christopher Cox) and
hedge fund managers is that the benefits of legalized short selling far
outweigh the harm it might cause.46 However, even proponents of
legitimate short selling acknowledge the harm that naked short selling can
cause and support efforts to monitor naked short selling.47 By looking
closely at the status of short sale regulation in the United Kingdom and the
United States, this comment will outline the current state of the short sale
debate.
IV. THE UNITED KINGDOM: CENTRALIZED AUTHORITY AND
CONCILIATORY REGULATION
The FSA is an integrated regulator with broad powers to regulate and
supervise "almost all financial services businesses in the U.K., including
banking, securities, and insurance, on a prudential basis and as regards
conduct-of-business activities."4 8  The FSA also has broad powers to
enforce financial regulation and to investigate and prosecute violations.4 9
The FSA's integrated approach to regulation is a product of major financial
reform in the United Kingdom in the past ten years.
While the FSA is a highly centralized financial regulator, the FSA
takes a "conciliatory" approach to market regulation by involving
stakeholders in policy debate and development. 50  As it did when
considering regulation of the hedge fund industry, the FSA reached out to
short sellers and other investors before regulating short sales in 2002 and
2003 and discussed with them the merits of regulating or deregulating short
selling.52 The recommendations and insight gathered by the FSA in these
discussions informed regulation until mid-2008.
The FSA's conciliatory approach is an outgrowth of the organization's
first incarnation as a system of "practitioner-based regulation in a statutory
framework."5  Following a series of highly publicized financial scandals in
the 1970s, Parliament ratified the Financial Services Act in November
1986.54 The Act imposed a series of costly regulatory systems and
46 See Cox, supra note 15.
47 id.
48 GROUP OF THIRTY, THE STRUCTURE OF FINANCIAL SUPERVISION: APPROACHES AND
CHALLENGES IN A GLOBAL MARKETPLACE 28 (2008), available at
http://www.deloitte.com/dtt/cda/doc/content/usfsibankingG30%20Final%20Report%201
0-3-08.pdf.
491 id. at 29.
so Matthew Lewis, Comment, A Transatlantic Dilemma: A Comparative Review of
American and British Hedge Fund Regulation, 22 EMORY INT'L L. REv. 347, 349 (2008).
" Id. at 373.
52 See generally DP 17, supra note 9.
5 Henry Laurence, Spawning the SEC, 6 IND. J. GLOBAL LEGAL STUD. 647, 662 (1999).
54 Id. at 661.
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compliance requirements on financial institutions and was gradually
watered down over the next fifteen years."s The costs imposed on financial
institutions made the Act unpopular in the City of London, and the apparent
failure of the practitioner-regulators empowered by the Act to end fraud and
protect small investors turned public opinion against the regime. 56 The
practitioner-regulators were unable to regulate effectively, and the
Securities and Investment Board ("SIB"), a quasi-governmental
organization meant to oversee the practitioner-regulators, did little to
improve the system."
In 1997, the Chancellor of the Exchequer initiated reform of the U.K.
financial sector regulatory regime.58  The reform consolidated regulation
and oversight of investment services in a restructured agency, the FSA,
which replaced the SIB in October 1997.59 The Financial Services and
Markets Act of 2000 gave the FSA broad statutory powers to regulate the
securities markets.6 0 The FSA's concentration of power moved regulatory
authority from fragmented private practitioner-regulators into the hands of a
single independent body. In spite of this concentration of authority, the
FSA remains committed to incorporating practitioners' interests into its
policies. The following discussion of short selling regulation illustrates this
point.
A. Discussion Paper 17
In 2002 and 2003, in the midst of a bear market that had exacerbated
concern about short selling among market participants, the FSA conducted
a thorough investigation of the nature and extent of short selling in the U.K.
financial markets. The study evaluated short selling and considered several
regulatory proposals. The FSA ultimately adopted the least costly and most
conservative of the proposals it considered.62
During the summer of 2002, the FSA hosted over twenty small
meetings with investors and other market participants and hosted a
ss Id. at 661-66.
5 Id. at 664-68.
SId. at 665, 668.
58 FSA, History, http://www.fsa.gov.uk/Pages/About/Who/History/index.shtml (last
visited Dec. 28, 2009).
59 Id
60 Id. ("The Financial Services and Markets Act... transferred to the FSA the
responsibilities of several other organisations: Building Societies Commission; Friendly
Societies Commission; Investment Management Regulatory Organisation; Personal
Investment Authority; Register of Friendly Societies; Securities and Futures Authority.").
61 FSA, Who Are We, http://www.fsa.gov.uk/Pages/About/Who/index.shtml (last visited
Dec. 28, 2009).
62 See FSA, SHORT SELLING: FEEDBACK ON DP17 (2003), available at
http://www.fsa.gov.uk/pubs/discussion/fsl7.pdf [hereinafter DP17 FEEDBACK STATEMENT];
DP17, supra note 9.
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roundtable discussion that hedge funds, prime brokers, securities lenders,
and corporate stakeholders attended. In his opening remarks at the
roundtable, FSA Chairman Howard Davies expressed the FSA's generally
positive view of short selling as an instrument of market efficiency and
encouraged participants in the roundtable to articulate their views of the
risks and benefits of short selling. 4 The options for new regulation and
improved transparency of short positions in financial markets discussed at
the roundtable closely coincide with the recommendations and proposals
the FSA published in Discussion Paper 17: Short Selling ("DPl7") in
October 2002.65
The purpose of DP17 was to "review how short selling is currently
practiced in U.K. equity markets, the role that it plays in the market, and
issues of regulatory concern in the context of market confidence and
investor protection."66 DP17 first considered the changes in U.K. financial
markets since SIB's last review of short selling in 1996-1997 (which took a
positive view of short selling, did not adopt new proposals, and concluded
that short selling "should be controlled through general measures to prevent
disorderly markets rather than specific limits on the ability to sell short").67
DP17 noted the "significant growth in funds using short selling" since
1996, the increased use of derivates in financial markets, and the new equity
trading rules and concluded that these new market features created need for
a new review of short selling.68
While acknowledging the risks associated with short selling (such as
settlement disruption and market manipulation), the FSA rejected banning
or imposing constraints on short selling-this meant that investors in the
United Kingdom could continue to use short sales and naked short sales as
legitimate hedging and arbitrage strategies. 69 The FSA explained that anti-
abuse rules, such as the Code of Market Conduct, already in place banned
and punished manipulative trading and bear raid tactics and concluded that
these measures sufficiently controlled the risk of market manipulation by
short sellers.70 Instead of imposing direct limitations on short selling, the
FSA evaluated ways to increase disclosure of short positions at the highest
utility and lowest cost and ways to reduce the risk of settlement disruption
63 Press Release, FSA, FSA Puts Forward Options for Improving Transparency in Short
Selling (Oct. 21, 2002), available at
http://www.fsa.gov.uk/Pages/Library/Communication/PR/2002/100.shtml.
6 Press Release, FSA, FSA Hosts Roundtable on Short Selling (Sept. 12, 2002),
available at http://www.fsa.gov.uk/Pages/Library/Communication/PR/2002/090.shtml.
65 Id.
66 DPl7, supra note 9, at 7.
67 Id. at 6-7.
68 Id. at 7.
69 Id. at 15.
70 Id. at 18.
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due to naked short sales. 7 1
The FSA outlined three options for improving transparency of short
selling in DP17:
Option 1: Marking and reporting short sales for cash equities
Option 2: Full disclosure of short positions in both cash and
derivatives markets
Option 3: Publishing data on securities lending as a proxy for data on
short selling72
Of these options, Option 3 was the least costly because it simply
required CRESTCo, the existing U.K. securities settlement system, to
publish the data collected in its records on a monthly basis-no new
reporting standards or significant data compilation efforts would be
required. 3 Perhaps not surprisingly in light of this cost efficiency and
because institutional investors opposed Options 1 and 2 which would have
been onerous to comply with and would have risked exposing their
investment strategies to competitors, 75% of respondents to DP17 endorsed
Option 3.74 Even though the FSA and DP17 respondents acknowledged the
imperfection of settlement data as a proxy for short selling data, they agreed
that Option 3 was the best of the proposed options.75
In its Feedback Statement to DP17 (the "DPl7 Feedback Statement" ,
the FSA rejected new regulation of short sales and adopted only Option 3.
The FSA explained:
We believe that publication of stock borrowing data is a cost-
effective way of improving market transparency. While the data
may not be a good proxy for short selling, we believe the information
is useful enough of itself to warrant publication. Provided sufficient
customer confidentiality protections are in place, publication should
not harm legitimate commercial interests. We also believe that
regular publication can, over time, provide a broad indication of
7 Id. at 15.
7 2 Id. at 21-25.
n Id. at 24.
74 Press Release, FSA, More Transparency for the Market Following the FSA's Short
Selling Review (Apr. 30, 2003), available at
http://www.fsa.gov.uk/Pages/Library/Connunication/PR/2003/057.shtml; DP17 FEEDBACK
STATEMENT, supra note 62, at 16.
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short selling trends.77
The FSA likewise rejected targeted disclosure requirements (namely
disclosure of short sales beyond certain established thresholds, disclosure of
naked short sales, and disclosure of directors' short sales) that would have
78ThFSincreased visibility of short positions. The FSA also rejected "tick
regimes" such as Rule 1Oa-1 formerly in place in the United States.79 Tick
regimes, discussed in the following section, prohibit short sales at prices
below the last traded price and aim to curb market abuse and bear raids.so
In DP17, the FSA explained that the U.K. exchanges prefer "general rules
and processes to safeguard against excessive price volatility" over price
limit tests. Moreover, the FSA explained it had "not seen a strong case
showing that tick rules curb share price volatility or soften market declines
... at least as far as this year is concerned, countries operating tick rules ...
have not seen less steep market falls or significantly reduced volatility than
the [United Kingdom]."82
Addressing the risks of fails caused by naked short sales but deciding
not to prohibit or directly limit them, the FSA adopted a "package of
measures" to reduce settlement risk and improve delivery in short sales of
illiquid securities.83 The measures were: (1) CRESTCo will publish data on
settlement failures for securities with the highest ratio of fails to issued
securities, (2) the London Stock Exchange and virt-x will notify their
members about securities with a high ratio of fails to issued securities, (3)
the London Stock Exchange might reduce the buy-in timeframe for illiquid
securities experiencing a high settlement failure rate, and (4) the exchanges
will keep penalties for buy-in under review.84 The FSA acknowledged that
naked short selling posed a risk to markets and attempted to form a solution
that was a "proportionate res onse" to the settlement disruption problems
posed by naked short selling. However, the Feedback Statement suggests
that the FSA was unwilling to impose significant changes to the regulatory
system already in place.
Both DP17 and the DP17 Feedback Statement reveal that in 2002 and
2003, the FSA was unwilling to curb short sales in U.K. financial markets
and believed that the utility of short selling outweighed the potential benefit
of regulating, or of requiring complete and explicit disclosure of, short
7Id. at 17-18.
78 Id. at 18-21.79 Id. at 4.
80 DP17, supra note 9, at 17.
81 Id.
82 id.
83 DP 17 FEEDBACK STATEMENT, supra note 62, at 22-24.
' Id. at 23-24.
8 Id. at 24.
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selling. In the first half of the decade, the FSA, hedge funds, investment
banks, and other institutional investors regarded full disclosure as onerous
and costly. The solid consensus among the FSA and respondents to DP17
broke down suddenly in 2008 when markets tumbled and the FSA adopted
draconian measures to curtail practices it once endorsed.
B. The FSA's Intervention in the 2008 Market Crisis
In the wake of the Northern Rock and Lehman Brothers collapses, the
FSA banned short sales of U.K. financial sector companies' securities and
imposed a set of new daily disclosure rules for net short positions in U.K.
financial sector companies. 86 Short Selling (No. 2) Instrument 2008, which
became effective on September 19, 2008, and which remained in place until
January 16, 2009, stated:
A person who enters into a transaction that (whether by itself or in
conjunction with other transactions) has the effect of: creating a net
short position in a [U.K.] financial sector company; or increasing
any net short position in a [U.K.] financial sector company that the
person had immediately before 19 September 2008; is, in the opinion
of the FSA, engaging in behaviour that is market abuse (misleading
behaviour).8 7
The statute revision also instructed: "Failure by a person who has a
disclosable short position in a [UK.] financial sector company to provide
adequate ongoing disclosure of their position is behaviour which, in the
opinion of the FSA, is market abuse (misleading behaviour)."8
The FSA made the changes suddenly, just days after Lehman Brothers
filed for bankruptcy, and the FSA ratified the new rules without
consultation.89  The deterioration of the financial markets and the
precipitous fall of Bear Stearns, Lehman Brothers, AIG, and Northern Rock
had put the FSA on alert that the markets needed emergency intervention-
and that hedge funds and institutional investors, whose unregulated
arbitrage tactics had been viewed in 2002 as the markets' highest-octane
fuel, might be partially responsible for the rapid decline. In January 2009,
when the short sale ban lapsed, the FSA left the heightened disclosure rules
in place. In February 2009, after a comprehensive review of short selling
during the 2008-2009 market crisis, the FSA proposed permanent
disclosure requirements and advocated international cooperation and
86 FSA, HANDBOOK NOTICE 81, at 3 (Sept. 26, 2008), available at
http://www.fsa.gov.uk/pubs/handbook/hbnotice8 1.pdf [hereinafter HANDBOOK NOTICE 81].
87 FSA, SHORT SELLING (No. 2) INSTRUMENT 2008 (Sept. 18, 2008), available at
http://www.fsa.gov.uk/pubs/handbook/instrument2_2008_50.pdf.
88 id.
89 HANDBOOK NOTICE 8 1, supra note 86, at 18.
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consensus with respect to short sale regulation.90 Section VI reviews the
FSA's current proposals in depth.
V. THE UNITED STATES: REGULATION OF SHORT SALES
Unlike the centralized and streamlined regulatory structure in the
United Kingdom, regulation in the U.S. is complex, fragmented and
duplicative. For example, securities and banking regulations have state and
federal components, while state authorities reglate insurance companies
and federal authorities regulate futures markets. While banking regulators
are primarily prudential regulators, the SEC is primarily an enforcement
authority.92 The apparent disarray of U.S. financial regulation reflects the
fragmented nature of the financial industry when Congress put in place the
foundation of the regulatory system. 93
The Securities Exchange Act of 1934, enacted while the shock of the
market crash of 1929 still burned in the collective memory of Congess and
the investing public, gave the SEC power to regulate short sales.9 In spite
of vigorous debates between proponents and opponents of short selling
(such as the debate between Whitney and Perkins captured above),
Congress elected not to impose direct statutory regulations and did not take
a firm position about the permissibility of short selling in the Exchange
Act.95 Section 10 of the Exchange Act delegated the power to regulate
short sales (or to leave short sales unregulated) to the SEC:
It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, by the use
of any means or instrumentality of interstate commerce or of the
mails, or of any facility of any national securities exchange [t]o
effect a short sale . .. of any security registered on a national
securities exchange, in contravention of such rules and regulations as
the Commission may prescribe as necessary or appropriate in the
public interest or for the protection of investors.96
A. Rule 1Oa-1
Shortly after the ratification of the Exchange Act and after studying
9o Press Release, FSA, FSA Proposes Enhanced Transparency Requirements on Short
Selling for all Stocks (Feb. 6, 2009), available at
http://www.fsa.gov.uk/pages/Library/Communication/PR/2009/023.shtml.
91 GROUP OF THIRTY, supra note 48, at 32-33.
92 Id. at 33.
9 Id. at 32.
94 15 U.S.C. § 78(j) (2007).
9s SEC Concept Release: Short Sales, Exchange Act Release No. 34-42037, 64 Fed. Reg.
57,996 (Oct. 20, 1999), available at http://www.sec.gov/rules/concept/34-
42037.htm#P60_12279 [hereinafter Release No. 34-42037].
96 15 U.S.C. § 78(j) (2007).
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short selling volumes in the bear market of 1937, the SEC adopted a rule to
curb the market manipulation risk of short selling.9 7 In January 1938, the
SEC adopted Rule lOa-1, a rule designed "to prohibit short selling in a
declining market" and to supplement the national securities exchanges'
short selling rules which the SEC believed had failed to curb market
abuse.98 The SEC concurrently adopted a statutory definition of "short
sale" in Rule 3b-3 (now Rule 200(a) of SEC Regulation SHO), quoted in
Section II.99
Rule lOa-1, which remained in place largely unmodified until 2007,
stated that any security registered on a national securities exchange may be
sold short at either (1) a price above the price at which the immediately
preceding sale was effected (a "plus tick"), or (2) a price equal to the last
sale price if it was higher than the last different price (a "zero-plus tick").'00
With only narrow exceptions, Rule 10a-1 prohibited short sales on "minus
ticks" or "zero-minus ticks."101 Rule lOa-1, commonly referred to as the
"tick test" or the "Uptick Rule," had three objectives: first, to allow short
selling in bull markets; second, to prevent market manipulators from using
short selling as a tool to drive market prices down; and, third, to prevent
short sellers from exhausting all remaining bids at one price level. 10 2
Contemporary critics of the tick test claim that while it "barred short sellers
from selling shares unless the stock price was rising, which had the impact
of cushioning the market impact of such selling," it was only "a symbolic
barrier against the kind of short selling that could cause stocks to fall
precipitously."' 0 3 Indeed, in a world of electronic trading and real-time
stock price adjustments, Rule lOa-l's requirements were modest
impediments to determined short sellers.
In 1963 and 1976, the SEC considered revising Rule lOa-1 after SEC
studies concluded that the short sale rules did not prevent the harm they
were designed to address.'0 The SEC's 1963 Special Study concluded that
the proportion of short sales in the total market volume of sales increased in
a declining market, suggesting that Rule lOa-1 did not curb short selling in
97 Securities Exchange Act Release No. 1,548, 3 Fed. Reg. 213 (Jan. 24, 1938).
98 Id.; see also Christopher M. Salter & Christopher F. Chase, Short Selling and Naked




99 Securities Exchange Act Release No. 1,548, supra note 97.
100 Release No. 34-42037, supra note 95.
101 Id.
102 id.
103 Kara Scannell & Jenny Strasburg, SEC Moves to Curb Short-Selling, WALL ST. J.,
July 16, 2008, at Al.
10 Salter & Chase, supra note 98, at 231-32.
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a bear market. 05  In 1976, the SEC proposed a temporary suspension of
Rule 1Oa-1 to investigate market operation without short sale price
limitation rules in place. 1 The SEC believed "'the availability of data with
respect to short selling continues to be inadequate to establish meaningful
conclusions' regarding the general effects of short selling or the efficacy of
short sale regulation."' 07 Moreover, the SEC "believed that it was possible
that no conclusive statistical evidence regarding the short or long-term
effects of short selling could be gathered while Rule lOa-1 limited short
selling activity, and that some type of suspension of the existing short sale
rules might be necessary."10 8
The SEC's proposal elicited a strong reaction from its respondents,
75% of whom opposed any suspension of short sale rules.109 Respondents,
including the NYSE and Amex, believed that a suspension would have
damaging consequences for investors, including greater day-to-day price
variability, accelerated price declines, and higher volatility in stock
markets. "0  Interestingly, only one issuer, AT&T, responded to the
proposal. AT&T condemned the proposal, citing a risk of increased
volatility and speculation in its stock." In 1980, the SEC withdrew its
proposal. The SEC did not attempt suspension of Rule lOa-1 for another
twenty-five years. 1 12
In 1988, the SEC also withdrew its Proposed Rule lOb-11 which
would have imposed borrowin requirements on short sellers and, therefore,
prohibited naked short selling. The rule would have required short sellers
to borrow the security or to have "reasonable grounds to believe that he, or
the person for whose account the short sale is effected, can borrow the
security, so that ... he or the person for whose account the short sale is
effected, will be capable of delivering the security on the date deliver is
due."ll 4 When the SEC first drafted Proposed Rule lOb-11 in 1976,' it
was "part of a comprehensive public fact-finding and rulemaking
proceeding on short sales to determine whether short sale regulation
105 Release No. 34-42037, supra note 95.
106 id





112 Release No. 34-42037, supra note 95.
" Salter & Chase, supra note 98, at 232-33.
114 Withdrawal of Proposed Rules, Exchange Act Release No. 26,182, 53 Fed. Reg.
41,206 (Oct. 14, 1988).
11s Short Sales of Securities: Public Fact-Finding Investigation and Rulemaking
Proceeding, Exchange Act Release No. 13,091, 41 Fed. Reg. 56,530 (proposed Dec. 21,
1976).
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continued to be necessary."" 6 Additionally, "[t]he Commission recognized
that the proposed rule in all likelihood reflected industry practice, but
believed that an express obligation with respect to a short seller's ability to
meet deliver requirements was appropriate should short sale rules be
rescinded.""
Once the SEC rejected terminating Rule lOa-1, it likewise dismissed
Proposed Rule l0b-1.118 Furthermore, the SEC recognized that the
national exchanges had imposed their own rules to control naked short
selling and was willing to allow the Self-Regulatory Organizations
("SROs") to self-regulate-at least for a while." 9 The principles outlined
in Proposed Rule l0b-l 1, which gave the SEC a greater role in the
regulation of settlements and short sales, and preempted some SRO rules,
reappeared in 2004 when the SEC adopted Regulation SHO.
B. Regulation SHO: A New Approach to Short Sale Regulation
The SEC promulgated new rules regulating short sales in 2004. These
rules, codified as Regulation SHO, mark an important shift in the SEC's
approach to short sale regulation. In its proposal of Regulation SHO, the
SEC concluded that the SROs' existing rules had "not fully addressed the
problems of naked short selling and extended fails to deliver" and that a
"uniform" rule would be a more effective regulation.120
Regulation SHO consists of three rules, Rule 200, Rule 202T, and
Rule 203, and largely replaced the short sales rules in place prior to 2004.121
Regulation SHO expanded the SEC's regulation of short sales. Rule 200
revised and replaced Rule 3b-3. 122 It revised definitions of terms including
"short sale" and ownership of a security.123 It also created requirements that
sell orders in all equity securities be marked "long," "short," or "short
exempt." 24
Rule 202T was a temporary rule that gave the SEC authority to
suspend Rule lOa-1 and parallel sale price limitation rules of the SROs to
116 Withdrawal of Proposed Rules, supra note 114.
1" Id.
118 Id.
" Proposed Rule Regarding Short Sales, Exchange Act Release No. 34-48709, 68 Fed.
Reg. 62,972 (proposed Oct. 28, 2003).
120 Id.
121 Regulation SHO Final Rule and Interpretation, Exchange Act Release No. 34-50103,
83 SEC Docket 1278 (July 28, 2004), available at
http://www.sec.gov/rules/final/34-50103.htm#IV [hereinafter Regulation SHO].
122 17 C.F.R. § 242.200 (2007).
123 Id.
124 Regulation SHO, supra note 121. The short sale transaction reporting requirement
changed in 2007 when the SEC revised the standard and required broker-dealers to mark
sales "short" or "long" only. See Nasdaqtrader.com, Regulation SHO,
http://www.nasdaqtrader.com/Trader.aspx?id=RegSho (last visited Dec. 28, 2009).
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investigate the effect of short sale price tests on the market.125 In Rule
202T, the SEC explained that it had "stated [its] belief that temporary
suspension of Commission and SRO price tests is an essential component of
evaluating the overall effectiveness of such restrictions, and would permit
the collection of data on the impact of short selling in the absence of a price
test." 26 The SEC considered implementing Rule 201 in 2004, which would
have removed Rule l0a-1 and parallel SRO rules, but deferred the proposal
until after the Rule 202T Pilot Test (the "Pilot"). 127
The SEC conducted the Pilot as authorized under Rule 202T from
2005 to 2007. The Pilot removed price tests from one thousand stocks and
analyzed data about price movement, trade volume, and trading transaction
type. 128 The Pilot's main findings included: (1) elimination of price test
restrictions resulted in a balanced use of up ticks and down ticks during the
trading process; (2) price restrictions distort liquidity by impeding the
trading process; (3) eliminating price tests did not affect fundamental
volatility across days; and (4) the inconsistencies in price tests among the
SROs distorted their competitive advantages for investors.12 The SEC
Office of Economic Analysis' review of the Pilot's short sale data
suggested that Rule 10a-1 did not effectively regulate short selling and
created inefficient opportunities for regulatory arbitrage. The SEC Office
of Economic Analysis concluded that that the SEC and the SROs should
remove rules that limit the execution price of short sales.130
The SEC's and other academic researchers' analysis of the Pilot's data
led to the removal of price tests and adoption of Rule 201 in 2007.131 The
SEC removed Rule l0a-1 and, in Rule 201, prohibited the SROs from
implementing their own price tests for short sales.132 Although a lauded
in 2007, the decision to remove price tests came under fire in 2008.
125 17 C.F.R. § 242.202T (2007).
126 Regulation SHO, supra note 121.
127 Id.; Press Release, Piper Rudnick, Client Alert: New SEC Rules Change Regulation of




128 Chester S. Spatt, Chief Economist Director, SEC Office of Economic Analysis,
Remarks Concerning the Pilot Analysis of Removing Pricing Restrictions on Short Sales
(Dec. 4, 2006), available at http://www.sec.gov/news/speech/2006/spch 120406css.htm.
129 id.
130 Id.; Press Release, O'Melveny & Meyers, SEC Repeals the 'Tick Test' on Short Sales
(July 2, 2007), available at http://www.omm.com/newsroont/publication.aspx?pub=483.
131 Press Release, O'Melveny & Meyers, supra note 130.
132 id.
133 See, e.g., Memorandum from Edward D. Herlihy & Theodore A. Levine, Wachtell,
Lipton, Rosen & Katz, to the firm's clients, It's Time for the SEC to Constrain Abusive Short
Selling (July 1, 2008), available at http://abajournal.comfiles/Julyl _client-memo.pdf
(condemning the SEC's decision to eliminate the Uptick Rule).
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Rule 203, the third rule enacted in Regulation SHO, created new
uniform borrowing and delivery requirements. Rule 203(a) requires broker-
dealers to make delivery in a sale of equity securities marked "long" when
due and prohibits them from using borrowed securities in such
transactions.134 Rule 203(b) closely echoes Proposed Rule lob-11. The
SEC explained:
Rule 203(b) creates a uniform Commission rule requiring a broker-
dealer, prior to effecting a short sale in any equity security, to
"locate" securities available for borrowing. . .. Rule 203 supplants
current overlapping SRO rules. Specifically, the rule prohibits a
broker-dealer from accepting a short sale order in any equity security
from another person, or effecting a short sale order for the broker-
dealer's own account unless the broker-dealer has (1) borrowed the
security, or entered into an arrangement to borrow the security, or (2)
has reasonable grounds to believe that the security can be borrowed
so that it can be delivered on the date delivery is due. 135
To comply with Rule 203(b), broker-dealers must document a "locate"
for each short sale transaction. 13 Broker-dealers also must use their
discretion to determine whether "reasonable grounds" exist to believe that
the security will be delivered-although the rule specifies safe harbors
including reasonable reliance on a customer's assurances that the security
can be borrowed and reasonable reliance on "Easy to Borrow" lists
maintained by the exchanges. 137
The necessity of Regulation SHO grew out of "longstanding problems
involving failures to deliver stock by the end of the standard three-day
settlement period for trades, some of which were symptoms of abusive
'naked' short selling." 38 Rule 203(b) was the SEC's most direct attempt to
curtail naked short sales. The 2007 amendments also enforced strict close-
out rules on broker-dealers:
Rule 203 of Regulation SHO imposes "close out" requirements on
broker-dealers. Rule 203(b)(3) provides that if a participant of a
registered clearing agency has a fail to deliver position at a registered
clearing agency in a threshold security for 13 consecutive settlement
days, the participant must take immediate action to close out the fail
to deliver position.. .. Until the participant fulfills the close-out
requirement, the participant ... [is] prohibited from accepting a short
sale order in the threshold security from any person, or effecting a
short sale in the threshold security for its own account, without
134 Regulation SHO, supra note 121.
'3 Id. (emphasis added).
136 Id.
3 Id.
138 Barbash, supra note 8, at 136.
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borrowing the security or entering into a bona fide arrangement to
borrow the security.
Even while it removed Rule lOa-l's tick regime, Regulation SHO and
its 2007 amendments represented an expansion of the SEC's regulatory and
rule-making authority with respect to short sales, and a reciprocal
diminution of the SRO's independent authority.
Multiple claims and settlements expose the shortfalls of Regulation
SHO as an adequate mechanism to regulate naked short selling. o For
example, in 2006, the NYSE Board found that Daiwa Securities America,
Inc. had violated Rule 203(b) by effecting short sales without borrowing or
making arrangements to borrow securities, and without reasonable grounds
to believe that securities could be borrowed for delivery when due.141 In
2007, the SEC determined that Goldman Sachs Execution & Clearing
("Goldman Clearing") had violated Rule 200 by failing to label transactions
accurately as required under the rule. 142 Goldman Clearing paid $1 million
in civil damages in this case.143 In spite of its failings, Regulation SHO
evidenced the SEC's commitment to implementing a manageable and
comprehensive system to monitor naked short selling and highlighted the
SEC's sensitivity to the potential harm abusive short selling can cause
capital markets.
C. SEC Emergency Rules and the 2008 Market Crisis
In 2008, a series of bank failures and extreme market volatility
undermined investor confidence and seemed to challenge the wisdom in the
SEC's recent short sale regulation amendments. While it is clear that lax
short sale regulation was not the principal driver behind the widespread
market failure, many critics argued (and the SEC conceded to some extent)
that insufficient short sale constraints facilitated the speculation in and
ultimate failure of Bear Steams and Lehman Brothers. In an Emergency
Order issued on July 15, 2008, which banned naked short sales of seventeen
major financial firms and Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, the SEC wrote:
13 Memorandum from Willkie Farr & Gallagher LLP to its clients, SEC Adopts
Amendments to Short Sale Rules (June 15, 2007), available at
http://willkie.org/firm/pubs-results.aspx?iEmployeeID=323267605.
140 See, e.g., Class Action Complaint, Electronic Trading Group LLC v. Banc of America
Securities LLC (In re Short Sale Antitrust Litigation), No. 06-CV-2859 (S.D.N.Y. 2006);
Amended Class Action Complaint, Electronic Trading Group LLC v. Banc of America
Securities LLC, No. 06-CV-2859 (S.D.N.Y. 2006).
141 NYSE Hearing Board Decision 06-113, Daiwa Securities America Inc. (June 28,
2006), available at http://www.nyse.com/pdfs/06-113.pdf.
142 In re Goldman Sachs Execution & Clearing, L.P., Exchange Act Release No. 55,465,
90 SEC Docket 538 (Mar. 14, 2007).
143 id.
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False rumors can lead to a loss of confidence in our markets. Such
loss of confidence can lead to panic selling, which may be further
exacerbated by "naked" short selling. As a result, the prices of
securities may artificially and unnecessarily decline well below the
price level that would have resulted from the normal price discovery
process. If significant financial institutions are involved, this chain of
events can threaten disruption of our markets.
The events preceding the sale of The Bear Steams Companies Inc.
are illustrative of the market impact of rumors. During the week of
March 10, 2008, rumors spread about liquidity problems at Bear
Steams, which eroded investor confidence in the firm. As Bear
Steams' stock price fell, its counterparties became concerned, and a
crisis of confidence occurred late in the week. In particular,
counterparties to Bear Steams were unwilling to make secured
funding available to Bear Steams on customary terms. In light of the
potentially systemic consequences of a failure of Bear Steams, the
Federal Reserve took emergency action.144
In additional emergency orders issued in September 2008, the SEC
temporarily prohibited short selling of the stocks of approximately 800
financial firms, required institutional money managers to report short sales
and short positions in certain securities, and eased restrictions on the ability
of issuers to repurchase their securities. 145 Interim Rule 1Oa-3T, adopted in
October 2008, required certain investment managers to disclose short sales
on Form SH, a new form adopted to increase transparency during the term
of the emergency order. Interim Rule lOa-3T also required asset managers
to file Form SH with the SEC on a weekly basis and to disclose their short
positions privately to the SEC in this fashion. 14 6 As in the United Kingdom,
the suddenly stringent SEC rules controlling short selling in 2008
represented a move away from the relatively lenient rules of the past.
As the FSA extended its disclosure rules, the SEC extended the Form
SH reporting requirements after the short sale ban expired on October 16,
'"July Emergency Order Taking Temporary Action to Respond to Market
Developments, Exchange Act Release No. 58,166, 73 Fed. Reg. 42,379 (July 15, 2008),
available at http://www.sec.gov/rules/other/2008/34-58166.pdf
145 September Emergency Order Taking Temporary Action to Respond To Market
Developments, Exchange Act Release No. 34-58592, 73 Fed. Reg. 55,169 (Sept. 18, 2008),
available at http://www.sec.gov/rules/other/2008/34-58592.pdf; Amendment To Emergency
Order Taking Temporary Action To Respond To Market Developments, Exchange Act
Release No. 58,591A, 73 Fed. Reg. 55,557 (Sept. 21, 2008), available at
http://www.sec.gov/rules/other/2008/34-58591a.pdf.
146 Disclosure of Short Sales and Short Positions by Institutional Investment Managers,
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2008.147 Rule 1Oa-3T, which expired on August 1, 2009, remained effective
while the SEC considered the impact of short selling on capital markets and
reviewed plans for future regulation. 14 8  On July 27, 2009, the SEC
announced that it would develop a new public disclosure system in
collaboration with the SROs after the expiration of Rule 10a-3T.14 9 The
primary objectives of the new public disclosure system will be to make the
following information available on the SROs' websites:
Daily Publication of Short Sale Volume Information. The SROs
will publish the aggregate short selling volume in each individual
equity security on a daily basis.
Disclosure of Short Sale Transaction Information. The SROs will
publish information regarding individual short sale transactions in all
exchange-listed equity securities on a one-month delayed basis.
Twice Monthly Disclosure of Fails Data. The SEC will publish
data regarding the numbers of fails to deliver for all equity securities
twice per month.'50
Section VI will consider the wisdom of extending the disclosure rules
and other policy options available to financial market regulators.
VI. THE CONTEMPORARY DEBATE
Even before the temporary short sale bans in the United States and
United Kingdom expired, financial economists and asset managers who use
short sale strategies in their investments lined up to make a case against
limits on short selling and to argue that banning short selling would only
exacerbate market inefficiencies. Indeed, as soon as the SEC implemented
the short sale bans, speculation grew that the emergency rules either had no
impact on market volatility or increased market volatility.'5 1 Criticism of
the FSA rules likewise appeared in the British press shortly after the FSA
147 Louise Story, A Debate as a Ban on Short-Selling Ends: Did it Make Any Difference?,
N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 8, 2008, at B8.
148 Andrew Ross Sorkin, S.E.C. Extends Short-Sale Disclosure Rules, N.Y. TIMES
DEALBOOK, Oct. 16, 2008, http://dealbook.blogs.nytimes.com/2008/10/16/sec-extends-short-
sale-disclosure-rule/.
149 Press Release, SEC, SEC Takes Steps to Curtail Abusive Short Sales and Increase
Market Transparency (July 27, 2009), available at
http://www.sec.gov/news/press/2009/2009-172.htm.
150 Id.
15 E.g., Arturo Bris, Shorting Financial Stocks Should Resume, WALL ST. J., Sept. 29,
2008, at A25 (calling on the SEC to "Stop the folly. End the ban").
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announced its new short sale restrictions. 15 2
Arturo Bris, a professor of finance at the Institute for Management
Development in Switzerland, argues that a close examination of trades on
the NYSE in July and August 2008 suggests that the ban on naked short
selling exacerbated fluctuations in the affected securities' prices and further
disrupted the functioning of fair, orderly equity markets.15 3 In an article
written in August 2008, Bris compared the performance of the nineteen
U.S. financial institution stocks targeted by the July SEC Emergency Order
to pools of fifty-nine U.S. financial firms not affected by the July
Emergency Order and seventy-three non-U.S. financial firms not affected
by the July Emergency Order.1 54 He analyzed trade-by-trade NYSE data
before the July Emergency Order and found that, although the market
quality of the nineteen stocks affected by the July Emergency Order was
worse than comparable U.S. financial stocks, the lower market quality was
not a product of short selling activities. 155 He also found that after July 21,
when the Emergency Order became effective, the nineteen targeted stocks
"suffered a significant reduction in intra-day return volatility and an
increase in spreads, which suggests a deterioration of market quality." 56
Bris' research suggests that market efficiency deteriorated after the July
Emergency Order went into effect:
In more efficient markets, individual stock returns co-move less with
the market, and are less correlated with past market returns as
information is impounded into prices immediately. Applying this
technique to the sample of financial stocks shows that overall market
efficiency has declined overall after the EO has become effective.
Additionally, the efficiency of G 19 stocks has deteriorated more than
152 See, e.g., Damian Reece, FSA Slams Stable Door, But Policy-Making On The Hoof
Won't Solve Crisis, TELEGRAPH, Sept. 19, 2008, available at
http://www.telegraph.co.uk/finance/comment/damianreece/2985356/FSA-slams-stable-door-
but-policy-making-on-the-hoof-wont-solve-crisis.html; Rachel Evans, UK Ignores Criticism
Of Shorting Ban, INT'L FIN. L. REV. Nov. 2008, at 11; Nicholas Pettifer, Be Warned: FSA
Wants to be Braver, INT'L FIN. L. REV. NEWS ANALYSIS, July 24, 2008,
http://www.iflr.com/Article/2006972/Be-warned-regulators-want-to-be-braver.html.
153 Bris, supra note 2.
154 Id. at 7.
1s5 Id at 5-6.
156 Bris further stated:
For example, from the pre-[Emergency Order] period to the post-[Emergency
Order] period, relative quoted spreads for G19 stocks have increased from 18
percent to 48 percent, but they have increased only from 11 percent to 29 percent
for comparable U.S. financial stocks. There has been no significant change in the
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the efficiency of comparable U.S. Financial stocks.'5 7
Bris' data suggests that proponents of short selling were right to
question and condemn the SEC and FSA's emergency regulations and short
sale bans-but preliminary results are weak authority to resolve an ongoing
policy debate in the midst of a financial crisis. Moreover, while Bris'
analysis looked at a ban on naked short selling, policymakers must consider
additional empirical research on other short sale constraints as they develop
a future regulatory regime. For example, a study published by the Cass
Business School (and discussed in detail in the following section) found
that the short sale bans did not curb market volatility."' Like Bris'
research, the Cass report is necessarily preliminary. Financial economists
have extensively investigated the effects of short sale constraints on market
efficiency and their research-remarkable for its consistent conclusion that
short selling increases market efficiency' 59-should be the basis and
underlying authority for the SEC's future regulation of short sales.
Several financial economists endorse the "Overpricing Hypothesis," a
theory that short sale constraints can cause stock prices to become
overpriced by limiting short-sellers' ability to correct inflated prices and by
slowing down the market's reaction to negative information about the
157 Id.
15 Press Release, Cass Business School, Short Selling Restrictions Have Had Little
Impact (Dec. 29, 2008), available at
http://www.cass.city.ac.uk/medialstories/Short-selling-restri.html.
159 See, e.g., Douglas W. Diamond & Robert E. Verrecchia, Constraints on Short-Selling
and Asset Price Adjustment to Private Information, 18 J. FIN. EcON. 277 (1987) (arguing that
prohibitions on short sales reduce the adjustment speed of stock prices to private information
and that imposing constraints on market pessimists (short sellers) undermines market
efficiency and causes an optimists' bias); Naoto Isaka, On the Informational Effect of Short-
Sales Constraints: Evidence from the Tokyo Stock Exchange, 30 J. FIN. REs. 455 (2007)
(arguing that constraints reduce the informational efficiency of stock prices and
demonstrating that short sale constraints reduce the adjustment speed of stock prices to
negative information about the financial performance of the underlying institution); Charles
M. Jones & Owen A. Lamont, Short-Sale Constraints and Stock Returns, 66 J. FIN. ECON.
207, 208-209 (2002) (arguing that the presence of short sale constraints can cause stocks to
become overpriced in otherwise efficient markets and showing that "stocks that are
expensive to short have low subsequent returns, consistent with the hypothesis that they are
overpriced"); Owen Lamont, Short Sale Constraints and Overpricing, NBER REPORTER,
Winter 2005, at 16, available at http://www.nber.org/reporter/winter05/winter05.pdf
(outlining the "Overpricing Hypothesis" which explains that "in extreme cases where short
sellers want to short a stock but find it difficult to do so, overpricing can be very large" and
identifying SEC regulations as one constraint that impedes short selling in U.S. equity
markets). But see, e.g., Jorgen Vitting Andersen, Could Short Selling Make Financial
Markets Tumble?, 8 INT'L J. THEORETiCAL & APPLIED FIN. 509, 519 (2005) (arguing that
higher volumes of short sales correlate with lower stock market returns and bear markets,
and suggesting that "[t]he real danger is instead when a downwards spiral of the markets has
begun, in which case an increase in short trading activity will only increase the downward
trend").
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underlying institution.160  The Overpricing Hypothesis and the various
empirical studies that evaluate and confirm it are evidence that market
regulators, in the interest of preserving and promoting market efficiency,
should not prohibit short selling. Market research also highlights a liquidity
benefit of short selling that supports regulations allowing safe short selling.
The Overpricing Hypothesis and supporting empirical research of financial
economists suggest that the most important question regulators should seek
to answer as they build a new regulatory system is not whether to allow
short selling, but rather how to allow short selling while controlling the
risks of abuse. Short selling is not a flawless market efficiency mechanism
and will not work without effective regulation and vigilant market
monitoring to detect and deter abuse.
A. Regulatory Options
Although stock markets remain volatile and well below their 2007
performance, the SEC and FSA have allowed their short sale bans to lapse.
Short selling regulation remains a primary policy concern for both
regulators, but the SEC and FSA seem to have adopted a more measured
tone in their policy discussions in the first quarters of 2009. Additionally,
both regulators seem to have acknowledged that short sale bans are not
good long-term policy and were not strong enough medicines to offer
financial institutions the protection they needed to weather the financial
crisis. In 2008, policymakers were hopeful that short sale bans, while
perhaps suboptimal policy, were a less costly alternative to government
bailouts of the financial sector.16 1 One year after several of the largest
bailouts of major international banks in history, regulators are embracing
disclosure regimes and transparency as a means of regulating short selling
and tracking abuse in real time, and are abandoning reactionary prohibitions
and rules ill-fitted for modern capital markets.
Several regulatory approaches that have been used in the past no
longer seem to be effective. Ineffective rules and regulations that should be
removed from regulators' arsenals include short-term reactionary bans on
all short selling in the midst of market crisis and Tick Tests such as Rule
1 Oa- 1 (retired by the SEC in 2007). Measures that should be part of future
regulation include strict close-out and settlement rules that ban naked short
positions that last more than a set number of days, circuit breaker rules, and
enhanced disclosure rules. Current SEC and FSA policy discussions
emphasize disclosure, a prudent priority in spite of protests by asset
managers.
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161 Heidi N. Moore, Short Selling: A Great Debate, WALL ST. J., Aug. 14, 2008, at C3.
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1. Short-Term Bans on All Short Selling
Some economists believe that aggressive short selling in bear markets
can exacerbate market volatility and decline. 162  However, preliminary
observation of market performance in 2008 after short selling bans were in
place suggests that banning short selling in the midst of a market crisis will
neither prevent a market's decline nor mitigate volatility.163 While the short
sale bans aimed to protect financial institutions, they do not seem to have
been effective and do seem to have shaken investor confidence in market
efficiency.'6" Moreover, neither the FSA nor any other regulator has found
evidence that short selling caused financial stocks to tumble. 165
A study produced by researchers at the Cass Business School in
London and commissioned by the International Securities Lending
Association, the Alternative Investment Management Association and the
London Investment Banking Association evaluated the performance of
U.K., U.S., Italian, French and German stocks before and after regulators in
each country implemented short sale bans. 166 The study compared the daily
returns of stocks that were subject to the restrictions to returns of stocks that
were not.167 The study found that the short sale bans did not change the
behavior of stock returns. Its principle findings were:
1. No strong evidence that restrictions on short selling changed the
behaviour of stock returns. Stocks subject to the restrictions
behaved very similarly both to how they behaved before their
imposition and to how stocks not subject to the restrictions
behaved.
2. Comparing behaviour across countries where the nature of the
restrictions differed, the authors found no systematic patterns
consistent with the expected effect of the new regulations, i.e.
no evidence of a reduced probability of large price falls.
162 E.g., Andersen, supra note 159; Culp & Heaton, supra note 10.
163 Simon Nixon, Short Ban was Short-Lived, WALL ST. J., Jan. 6, 2009, at C10 ("[T]here
is no evidence that short-selling bans served any useful purpose. Bank shares continued to
tumble after the ban. A study by Cass Business School, comparing bank shares across
various markets, found no differences that could be explained by the ban. A better
explanation is simply the rush by investors to dump bank stocks.").
'" Id164 id.
166 d
166 Press Release, Cass Business School, supra note 158; Ian W. Marsh & Norman
Niemer, The Impact of Short Sales Restrictions (Nov. 30, 2008) (unpublished manuscript, on
file with the International Securities Lending Association, the Alternative Investment
Management Association and the London Investment Banking Association), available at
http://www.cass.city.ac.uk/medialstories/resources/the-impact-of-short-sales-restrictions.pdf.
167 Marsh & Niemer, supra note 166, at 4.
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3. The authors also found no sign of any detrimental impact of the
constraints in terms of reduced efficiency of pricing ... .168
The results of the Cass Business School study support an argument
that short-term emergency orders to suspend short selling are not effective
measures to restore normalcy to markets in crisis. The study, published in
late November 2008, should be re-evaluated after more time has passed
since the bans and the markets have moved closer to a normal state. As
markets normalize, researchers will have a more extensive data set to
analyze.
Owen Lamont and Jeremy Stein analyzed the apparent market
anomaly that aggregate short interest tends to be relatively low in a bull
market (when, by definition, many stocks are overpriced). 16 Their research
looked specifically at the Dot-Coin Bubble. They argue that open-ended
hedge funds, which allow investors to withdraw their funds at any time,
mute the market correcting potential of rational arbitragers who would take
short positions in bull markets.17 0 When the market rises, Lamont and Stein
explain, rationale arbitragers who had taken short positions in overvalued
companies will lose money.171 Investors in these rational arbitrage funds
will redeem their investments and the funds will have to scale back their
positions. Consequently, Lamont and Stein argue, aggregate short interest
remains small in a bull market. Lamont and Stein conclude that "the
problem is not too much short-selling in falling markets . .. but rather, too
little in rising markets." 72  Their research, coupled with Arturo Bris'
evidence that aggregate short interest does not markedly increase during a
bear market, suggests that the best policy in periods of market growth and
contraction is to allow short selling.
While additional empirical research should be conducted to determine
the efficacy of the short-term bans of 2008, preliminary research suggests
that the bans were not effective regulation and did not calm markets or
protect the stocks subject to the ban from volatility. Preliminary research
seems to confirm the notion that short sale bans will not calm market
volatility, and that investors' sentiment and confidence level dictate market
performance to a greater extent than short sale volume. Therefore, in future
market crashes, regulators should rely on real-time surveillance and
aggressive anti-fraud and anti-abuse regulation instead of drastic emergency
rules that prohibit normal market operation and erode investor confidence.
168 Press Release, Cass Business School, supra note 158.
169 Owen A. Lamont & Jeremy C. Stein, Aggregate Short Interest and Market
Valuations, AM. ECON. REv., May 2004, at 29.
70 Id. at 31.
171 Id.
172 Id. at 32.
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2. Tick Tests
Several memoranda published by Wachtell, Lipton, Rosen & Katz
("Wachtell") call on the SEC to reinstate Rule l0a-1.' Wachtell criticized
not only the SEC's decision to remove Rule l0a-1 but also the Pilot
Program that informed the SEC's decision. In its condemnation, Wachtell
argues that the SEC conducted its Pilot Program in a bull market in which
the need for regulation and risk of market manipulation was relative1' low
and that the Uptick Rule is an important market safety measure.' In
January 2009, Representative Gary Ackerman, a member of the House
Financial Services Committee, introduced legislation to reinstate the Uptick
Rule.'75  In April 2009, the SEC released new proposals for short sale
regulation, including proposals to reinstate a tick test. ' The SEC
continues to weigh proposals and plans a roundtable meeting to discuss
them on September 30, 2009.'7 Ackerman's proposal and the SEC
proposals highlight the ongoing debate among policymakers about the
impact of short selling-and the uncertainty about which anti-abuse
measures to adopt.
Former SEC Chairman David Ruder argues that the Uptick Rule is no
longer effective in markets in which investors follow and make trade
decisions based on fraction-of-a-penny price adjustments. 7 1 Indeed,
decimal pricing is often cited as a reason Rule 1Oa-1 and other sale price
limitations are no longer effective ways to curb abusive selling.
In its February 2009 Discussion Paper on short selling, the FSA
evaluated a tick test as a possible means of regulating short selling and
limiting market abuse by short sellers. The FSA drew lessons from the
SEC's experience with Rule l0a-1 and referenced the conclusions of the
SEC Pilot Test that "the SEC 'should remove price test restrictions because
they modestly reduce liquidity and do not appear necessary to prevent
173 See Memorandum from Herlihy & Levine, supra note 133; Memorandum from
Edward D. Herlihy & Theodore A. Levine, Wachtell, Lipton, Rosen & Katz, to the firm's
clients, Today the SEC Must Step Up (Sept. 16, 2008), available at
http://amlawdaily.typepad.com/amlawdaily/files/todaythe sec must step up.pdf
Memorandum from Edward D. Herlihy & Theodore A. Levine,Wachtell, Lipton, Rosen &
Katz, to the firm's clients, Reinstate the "Uptick Rule" (Nov. 20, 2008), available at
http://amlawdaily.typepad.com/amlawdaily/files/reinstate the uptickrule.pdf.
174 Memorandum from Herlihy & Levine, supra note 133.
175 Alistair Barr, Crisis on Wall Street: As Some 'Shorts' Thrive, More Calls for
Regulation, WALL ST. J., Jan. 10, 2009, at B3.
17 Amendments to Regulation SHO, Exchange Act Release No. 34-59748, 74 Fed. Reg.
18,042 (Apr. 10, 2009), available at http://www.sec.gov/rules/proposed/2009/34-59748.pdf
[hereinafter Amendments No. 34-59748]; Press Release, SEC, SEC Seeks Comments on
Short Sale Price Test and Circuit Breaker Restrictions (Apr. 8, 2009), available at
http://www.sec.gov/news/press/2009/2009-76.htm.
17 See Press Release, SEC, supra note 176.
178 David Ruder, Former SEC Chairman, Remarks at Northwestern University School of
Law (Oct. 9, 2008).
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manipulation."'. 9  The FSA noted, "[a]nother key finding was that there
was no evidence that there was an association between extreme price
movements and the absence of a tick regime."180 The FSA rejected a tick
test as a means of controlling short sale risks, citing the high costs of
implementing a regime to apply the rule and the risk of eliminating
legitimate short selling strategies.' While compliance with a reinstated
tick regime might be easier in the United States where infrastructure is in
place and the exchanges would be able to re-establish their enforcement
mechanisms, the reasoning of the 2007 decision to revoke Rule lOa-1 and
the FSA's analysis of the net negative effects of a tick test should
discourage the SEC and Congress from reinstating a tick rule in the United
States. Tick tests are costly and ineffective risk reduction measures not
appropriate for modem markets.
3. Close-out and Settlement Rules
Arturo Bris evaluated the impact of the SEC's ban on naked short
selling in July and August 2008 and discovered that the ban had negative
effects on market quality and market efficiency. 182 Financial economists
and regulators regard naked short selling as a cause of market volatility and
a tactic of market abuse by manipulative short sellers. 183 These concerns
are supported by economic models and by real-world scandals and exposed
abusive strategies. However, there is also evidence that naked short selling
can benefit markets:
179 FSA, DISCUSSION PAPER 09/1: SHORT SELLING 22 (2009), available at
http://www.fsa.gov.uk/pubs/discussion/dp09_01.pdf [hereinafter DPO9/1].
180 id.
181 The FSA stated:
[W]e share the view that tick rules provide limited protection against the negative
effects of short selling, at most acting to temporarily decelerate share price
declines. What does seem clear is that tick rules come at substantial cost if none of
the necessary infrastructure is already in place. Most significantly, in order to be
effective, tick rules require a marking (or flagging) regime to be operated by
market participants, exchanges and clearing and settlement houses alike. Without
such a regime, individual trades cannot be identified as short sales and, should
circumstances require it, be blocked. In addition, they have the potential to
eliminate legitimate short selling strategies, making the price formulation process
more inefficient and reducing liquidity. Additionally, given the increasing
fragmentation of trading venues and the absence of a consolidated tape, the cross-
exchange consistent application of such a rule would carry with it substantial
compliance costs. Id.
182 Bris, supra note 2.
183 E.g., Culp & Heaton, supra note 10 (providing an economic analysis of how naked
short selling can increase market volatility when short sellers buy stock to cover their
positions and the price subsequently falls down to an equilibrium value); Cox, supra note 15
(describing the effect of short selling on Bear Stearns).
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Naked short selling creates competition in the market for security
lending by allowing a new buyer to provide the service of being
owed the share rather than allowing only the current owner to do so.
To the extent that competition in the securities lending market is
desirable-and it is difficult to argue that it is not desirable if the
underlying market itself is valuable-then naked short selling, far
from being detrimental, may be valuable in facilitating the gains
from short selling.1 84
Indeed, one of the most often cited benefits of short selling is its
liquidity benefit, and naked short selling increases market liquidity by
expanding the market for stock lending.
In its February 2009 Discussion Paper, the FSA determined that a
prohibition on naked short selling or a requirement that all short selling be
covered would have a net negative effect.185  The FSA reviewed the
mechanisms in place in the United Kingdom to reduce the risk of settlement
failure, namely the U.K. Recognised Investment Exchanges and Recognised
Clearing Houses, and the stock exchanges' regimes to punish repeated fails.
The FSA concluded, "[t]o the extent that non-delivery remains an issue, it is
probably more proportionate to address that through tightening of
settlement rules rather than by introducing a blanket ban on naked
shorting."l 86 While the FSA noted the higher risk of market abuse and
volatility if naked short sales are not regulated, and noted that a requirement
that all short sales be covered would curb aggressive short selling, it
rejected a blanket prohibition."s'
The Discussion Paper evaluated several disadvantages to a ban on
naked short sales and proposed that a ban would "prevent legitimate
behaviour which can provide beneficial market impacts":
For example, a naked short selling prohibition would stop intraday
naked short selling (e.g. by day traders), an activity generally
184 Culp & Heaton, supra note 10, at 51.
185 DPO9/1, supra note 179, at 18.
186 Id. at 17.
187 The FSA stated:
[A naked short sale ban] limits the speed and the extent to which a short selling
strategy can be executed and thus can act as a brake on more aggressive short
selling (which would normally carry commensurate risks). This is because the
short seller will have to expend time and resources locating and borrowing the
stock and there will always be a cap on the amount of stock that can be borrowed,
namely the amount of issued share capital. Neither of these limitations applies to
naked short sellers who can, in theory, short more that 100% of the shares in issue.
However, it is not clear to what extent naked shorting is used to take significant
positions. Our contacts with market participants suggest that those wishing to take
big positions do so on a covered basis. Id.
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accepted to be legitimate trading that provides valuable liquidity to
the system and does not pose a significant risk of settlement
disruption. In particular, such a prohibition would significantly
impair the ability of market makers to function properly, as it is often
a necessary part of their role to short sell to meet client demand for a
stock (where their own inventories are exhausted). 88
Evidence of the liquidity benefits of naked short selling should not
prompt policymakers to allow naked short selling without oversight or
regulation. While naked short selling may be economically similar to
covered short selling, it is an easy tool of market manipulators and can be
used to create a large surplus of borrowed shares, which does not represent
shareholder's willingness to lend. Some countries, like Australia, have
long-standing prohibitions on naked short selling while others, like the
United States and United Kingdom, allow naked short selling but have
regulatory systems in place to oversee prompt settlement and close-out. 189
The FSA Discussion Paper makes the important argument that the
harm that can result from naked short sales and persistent fails can be
controlled by strong regulation of the settlement process, shortened
settlement periods, and strict close-out rules. These objectives, which were
the primary objectives underlying Regulation SHO, continue to be the bases
of naked short sale regulation in the United States. The SEC adopted Rule
204 in July 2009 which made permanent Rule 204T, an interim temporary
rule adopted in 2008. Rule 204 aims to curb naked short selling by
strengthening close-out rules and requiring broker-dealers to "immediately
purchase or borrow securities to close out the fail to deliver position by no
later than the beginning of regular trading hours on the settlement da
following the day the participant incurred the fail to deliver position." 0
188 Id
189 In October 2008, the SEC installed Rule lOb-21, a new naked short selling antifraud
rule, that reinforces the existing settlement and close-out rules of Regulation SHO:
Rule 1Ob-21 takes direct aim at an activity that may create fails to deliver. Those
fails can have a negative effect on shareholders, potentially depriving them of the
benefits of ownership, such as voting and lending. They also may create a
misleading impression of the market for an issuer's securities. Rule lOb-21 will
also aid broker-dealers in complying with the locate requirement of Regulation
SHO and, thereby, potentially reduce fails to deliver. In addition, Rule 10b-21
could help reduce manipulative schemes involving "naked" short selling.
"Naked" Short Selling Antifraud Rule, Exchange Act Release No. 34-58774, 73 Fed. Reg.
61,666 (Oct. 14, 2008), available at http://www.sec.gov/rules/final/2008/34-58774.pdf.
Rule lOb-21 suggests that the SEC remains committed to the regulatory system developed in
Regulation SHO and recognizes that better enforcement of existing settlement and close-out
rules will help curb market abuse and reduce the threat of bear raids.
190 Amendments to Regulation SHO, Exchange Act Release No. 34-60388, 74 Fed. Reg.
38,266 (July 27, 2009), available at http://www.sec.gov/rules/final/2009/34-60388.pdf.
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Since adopting Rule 204, the SEC has actively enforced its requirements.' 9'
Settlement problems and high instances of failure to deliver do not call
for new regulation. Rather, they call for better enforcement of existing
regulation. The FSA and SEC are wise to highlight certain advantages of
naked short selling with regulated and closely monitored settlement periods,
and other regulators should follow their lead.
4. Circuit Breaker Rules
"Circuit breaker" rules, such as the regime enforced by the London
Stock Exchange ("LSE"), which prohibit short sales after a defined decline
in the price of a security, are one alternate means of regulating abusive short
selling and protecting underlying issuers from manipulation of their stock
price. For example, under a circuit breaker rule, an exchange would
suspend short selling of a certain stock if the price fell more than 10% (or
any defined threshold) in a single day. Similarly, a regulator could suspend
all trading in a stock if the stock price fell below the threshold.
While the SROs could implement their own rules and considered
doing so in 2008,192 the SEC could also issue a uniform rule. The proposed
short sale regulations currently under review by the SEC include three
circuit breaker proposals. 93 A uniform rule issued by the SEC would create
consistency across exchanges and could be drafted to give the SEC a direct
and active oversight position-perhaps filling gaps in what has been
regarded as insufficient oversight in 2008. Moreover, a uniform rule would
avoid discrepancies in the SRO's rules, which would invite regulatory
arbitrage by investors, and prevent a race to the bottom among SROs eager
to attract investors.
In its February 2009 Discussion Paper, the FSA considered and
rejected implementing circuit breaker rules. The FSA detailed the LSE's
automatic execution suspension periods (AESPs) and concluded that
current regulations were sufficient to mitigate risk and prevent abuse.194
The FSA's disinclination to adopt circuit breaker rules reflects the
regulator's decision to leave control of circuit breakers to the exchanges.
The similar relationship between the SEC and the SROs in the United
States suggests that both regulators must weigh the costs and benefits of
centralized regulation as they build new short sale rules. Indeed, as the
SEC considers circuit breaker rule proposals, it will give careful attention to
the costs and regulatory burden a new regime would impose on SROs and
' Press Release, SEC, SEC Charges Options Traders and Broker-Dealers for "Naked"
Short Sale Rule Violations (Aug. 5, 2009), available at
http://www.sec.gov/news/press/2009/2009-179.htm.
192 Kara Scannell, Exchanges Discuss Circuit Breaker Tied to Short Selling, WALL ST. J.,
Oct. 11, 2008, at B3.
19 Amendments No. 34-59748, supra note 176.
194 DPO9/1, supra note 179, at 21.
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the SEC.' The FSA's decision to leave circuit breaker rules to the LSE
might not be the optimal strategy because it will encourage investors to
migrate towards markets with favorable regulation, and risk creating a race
to the bottom among market regulators.
5. Enhanced Disclosure Requirements
While temporary short sale bans have lapsed, enhanced disclosure
requirements remain in place, albeit in a different form than the rules first
implemented in Fall 2008. In spite of protest from hedge fund managers
and fund associations, proposals for enhanced disclosure have the most
support among policymakers. Hedge fund managers oppose disclosure
requirements because they believe that if their short positions are made
public, other investors will match their trading positions and thereby
undermine their strategies.196  Richard Gilbert, chief executive of the
Investment and Financial Services Association in Australia, collaborated
with hedge fund industry associations in the United States and the United
Kingdom to warn regulators about the harmful effects of public disclosure
of short positions and call for a consistent international approach to short
sale regulation.197 Gilbert suggested that short positions should be made
known to regulators in close-to-real-time, but that positions should not be
made public for at least two weeks after the transactions.198
As of March 6, 2009, the FSA has heightened disclosure requirements
in place. The temporary FSA rules require asset managers to publicly
disclose short positions in specified financial stocks worth .25% of a
company's total outstanding stock.' 99 These temporary heightened rules,
unpopular with asset managers, are likely to give way to an even more
onerous regime under the FSA's new regulatory proposal.
The FSA's February 2009 Discussion Paper on Short Selling
("DPO9/1") proposed a more rigorous and comprehensive disclosure
requirement: asset managers would have to disclose short positions worth
.5% of a company's issued share capital, 200 and would have to disclose
changes in short positions if the change interval exceeded .1% of a
company's issued share capital. 20' The proposed disclosure requirements
would apply to all stocks traded on UK exchanges. Shortly after the FSA
195 Amendments No. 34-59748, supra note 176.
196 Peter Smith & Tom Mitchell, Fund Heads Voice Short Selling Fears, FIN. TIMES, Jan.
8, 2009, at 27.
197 d.
198 Id
199 Jennifer Hughes, FSA Proposes Full Disclosure of Short Positions, FT.coM, Feb. 6,
2009, available at http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/2f71312a-f458-1 1dd-8e76-
0000779fd2ac.html?ftcamp=rss&nclick check=1.
200 Id.; DPO9/1, supra note 179, at 31.
201 DPO9/1, supra note 179, at 32.
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released DPO9/1, Sally Dewar, managing director of wholesale and
institutional markets at the FSA said, "We believe that enhanced disclosure
is the right way forward.... We also consider it to be important that we
align our proposals with those being developed on an international basis
and we are working towards this." 2 In DPO9/1, the FSA weighed the
market benefits of public disclosure (including detection of market abuse
and visibility of unusual short selling activity that would otherwise cause an
over-reaction) against the harm to asset managers of public disclosure and
the costs to asset managers of compliance. The FSA concluded:
The question is therefore whether the indirect costs of requiring
public disclosures outweigh the benefits. We acknowledge that
some market participants would prefer for any disclosures to be done
privately to the FSA, arguing that public disclosure might have
potentially harmful commercial effects. They are concerned that
disclosures might make themselves vulnerable to being squeezed by
competitors when it comes time to cover their short position. Against
this, without any form of public disclosure, much of the benefit of
disclosure as a potential constraint on aggressive large-scale short
selling leading to disorderly markets would be lost. In addition, the
informational benefits to the wider market of having transparency of
information on significant short positions would also be lost. ... On
balance, we consider that the benefits of having public disclosure of
significant short positions outweigh the costs and that the short
selling disclosure regime should be on this basis. 203
Hedge fund managers have reacted to the FSA proposal with criticism.
Condemning the FSA proposal, Andrew Baker, chief executive of the
Alternative Investment Management Association, an international hedge
fund association, said "[i]f short selling is a good thing because of price
discovery and supplying liquidity to the marketplace [as the FSA said] then
you have got to provide the conditions in which it thrives: it needs water,
oxygen and food and not much light.,204 Baker called for disclosure of
aggregate positions, showing the total short holdings in each company
rather than the specific holding of each investor.20 5 The FSA rejected this
proposal in DPO9/1.206
202 Hughes, supra note 199.
203 DPO9/1, supra note 179, at 29.
204 Jennifer Hughes & James Mackintosh, FSA Seeks More Disclosure Of Short Selling,
FIN. TIMES, Feb. 7, 2009, at 14.
205 id
206 DPO9/1, supra note 179, at 29.
For the sake of completeness we should also note that we see little value in a
regime which required disclosure of individual positions to the regulator and then
U.S. publishing aggregate information about those positions. It would only give
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Current U.S. regulation of short sales also focuses on disclosure.
However, the SEC initially opposed daily public disclosure of short
positions held by asset managers. Interim Rule lOa-3T required disclosure
only to the SEC and on a weekly basis. When it adopted Rule 1Oa-3T, the
SEC commented: "we are concerned that publicly available Form SH data
could give rise to additional, imitative short selling. Accordingly Rule lOa-
3T states that all Forms SH filed with the Commission will be nonpublic to
the extent permitted by law. 207 This rule expired on August 1, 2009, at
which time the SEC announced plans to collaborate with SROs to make
short sale volume and transaction data publicly available on the internet.
The SEC-SRO disclosure plan suggests that the SEC's position with respect
to public disclosure has moved closer to that of the FSA.
Both the SEC and the FSA believe that a permanent disclosure
requirement will improve regulators' ability to monitor abusive short
selling. However, the debates on the relative merits of public and non-
public disclosure and the relative merits of real-time and periodic disclosure
are likely to continue, with hedge funds lobbying aggressively for
nonpublic and periodic disclosure only. While disclosure to regulators
should be sufficient to allow regulators to police market manipulation, the
FSA's argument that public disclosure will temper speculation and over-
reaction by investors to short selling-induced volatility is compelling.
Carefully investigating and evaluating the impact of new disclosure
requirements will be the most important step for regulators and
policymakers to take before implementing a new regime, and involving
hedge funds in the dialogue will be an important way to make sure that the
regime works. However, including disclosure in future long-term policy
will be a crucial element of monitoring manipulation and abuse and will
help preempt emergency regulations (like the 2008 bans) in the midst of the
next market crisis. Transparency-at least for financial market regulators-
will reduce the information asymmetries that encourage market
manipulators to exploit lax regulation and cause regulators to over-react to
periods of market decline and volatility.
B. Calls for International Cooperation
Another important feature of the growing consensus regarding short
sale regulation is the sensitivity of national market regulators to the global
impact of their rules and regulations. The SEC and FSA, in addition to
SROs and industry associations, are collaborating to develop a short sale
regulatory system that minimizes opportunity for regulatory arbitrage and
partial and arguably misleading information about the extent of short positions in
individual stocks.
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helps to avoid abuse by international short-sellers. Without international
cooperation, short sale regulation could turn into a "race to the bottom" in
which market regulators reduce restrictions and relax enforcement in an
attempt to attract capital to their markets. Additionally, the growth of
sophisticated investors using increasingly complex and sophisticated short
sale strategies and the increasing incidence of fraud and abuse by these
investors have alerted regulators to the need for better protection to guard
their capital markets from systemic risk.
The integrated and global character of financial markets and national
economies caused many regulators to apply their own short sale bans in
2008 after the SEC and FSA announced theirs.208 Without parallel
protections, small market regulators feared, smaller or secondary capital
markets would be exposed to "attack by short sellers."2 09 In addition to the
United States and United Kingdom, Australia, Belgium, France, Germany,
Switzerland, and several Asian countries announced short sale bans in
2008. Australia, Belgium, France, Germany, and Switzerland extended
their short sales bans into 2009.210 Current attention to international
coordination about new policy and the domino effect of short selling bans
in the summer and fall of 2008 suggest that regulators are sensitive to the
risk of regulatory arbitrage-and wisely sensitive to the need for a global
strategy to curb capital market manipulation.
VII. CONCLUSION
Even though most regulators have allowed their short sale bans to
lapse and seem to be thinking constructively about the form of future
regulation, the dust has not settled on the short sale debate. As the events of
the past year outline, short selling regulations tend to mirror the capital
markets they oversee. In years of market growth, the risk of market
manipulation by abusive short sellers seems low. Regulation becomes
unpopular because it imposes costs on investors and investment managers
and because it reduces market liquidity and undermines the price
stabilization benefit of short selling. In bull markets, as the SEC Pilot
suggested, the call for regulation decreases. However, in periods of market
decline and financial crisis, greater regulation seems necessary to curb the
impact of pessimistic rumors and doomsday speculation. In these
conditions, greater regulation-or suspension-of short selling looks like a
quick tonic for an ailing market. The challenges regulators face are finding
the right balance of oversight and interference and building a regulatory
system that responds effectively to market fluctuation. The very low level
of investor confidence in 2009 reveals that sudden, stringent regulation
208 Hughes, supra note 199.
209 id
210 Pauline Skypala, Need to Make Clear Views on Short Selling, FIN. TIMEs, Jan. 12,
2009, at 6.
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calms neither markets nor nerves-and that market regulators must answer
calls for emergency regulation with prudence and restraint.
Increased disclosure of short positions will increase the visibility of
short sale transactions and make the market for borrowed stock transparent.
This comment argues that transparency will help regulators understand
what factors drive stock price volatility and cause market crashes. It also
posits that strictly enforced settlement and close-out rules that curb naked
short selling and make short sale transactions predictable and consistent
will deter market manipulation. Strict settlement and close-out rules will
also reduce the threat of abuse and bear raids that drive down the stock
price of otherwise healthy issuers. With better understanding of the role
short sellers play in a bear market and the relationship between market
disruption and short sale volume, regulators will be able to punish abuse
selectively and will avoid punishing the entire market with onerous and
inefficient restrictions.
As markets normalize, regulations should follow suit and regulators
should once again allow short selling and naked short selling with careful
settlement requirements. Evidence that restriction of short selling causes
overpricing of stock and higher levels of market inefficiency even in a bear
market suggests that regulators should allow short selling while carefully
monitoring the short positions of aggressive traders. Allowing controlled
short selling will increase liquidity and allow hedge funds and other
institutional short sellers to continue to move markets towards efficient
prices, thereby restoring faith in markets over time.
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